

IMO Seminar on Development of a Regulatory Framework
for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS)

5th and 6th September 2022

Development and Demonstration of Autonomous Ships in Japan

5th September 2022

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
Please check DFFAS short movie (8 mins) on Youtube

<https://youtu.be/oWy0l15OzmA>



DFFAS system overview

Telecommunication system
(3 satellite and 1 terrestrial communication lines, information management & control)




Land-based system
(land-based support functions)

DFFAS



Onboard system (autonomous functions)



Integrated Display Block
(ship information collection, monitoring & analysis)
(engine remote monitoring, control & anomaly detection)




Emergency Response Block
(remote operation function)

Outline

- 1. Introduction of DFFAS Project**
2. System overview
3. System design and development process
4. Demonstration
5. Summary

Our view of autonomous ship roadmap and MEGURI 2040 program



DFFAS Project (Designing the Future of Full Autonomous Ship)



▶ Target


- Demonstrate fully autonomous ship navigation functions under MEGURI 2040 program in Mar 2022

▶ DFFAS consortium members & partners

- Consortium: 30 organizations (domestic)
- Total: 60+ organizations (including global partners)

▶ Schedule

- Feb 2020 – Mar 2022 (abt. 2 years)



Background target: Develop open architecture & open process for autonomous ship design, development, construction, commission and operation for to realize social implementation of autonomous ships for all autonomous levels.


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Definition of system requirements with deep domain knowledge

To formulate the conceptual design of an autonomous navigation system, two deep knowledge domains, the master mariners' and chief engineers' knowledge of the operational domain and the manufacturers' knowledge of the technical domain, were essential,

- ▶ Master mariners and chief engineers, who are well versed in ship operations, lead the project, define the concept of operations (ConOps), design autonomous ship navigation system and iterate risk assessment, for eliciting system requirements together with engineers of manufactures and system specialists by using **Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)** approach.



High level concept description by using use case diagram

Table 3.1: Task category, executor and location

Task		Executor	Location
Situation awareness (Detection)	Long Term Object & Event Detection (LOED)	Machine, Human	Shore
	Short Term Object & Event Detection (SOED)	Machine	On board
Decision making (Integration/Analysis/Planning)	L-Event Response & Path Planning (LERPP)	Machine Human (including/restriction, approval)	Shore
	S-Event Response & Path Planning (SERPP)	Machine	On board Shore (status: AM/RFB)
		Human	Shore (status: AM/RFB)
	CIM	Machine Human (operation for system status)	On board Shore
Execution (Control/Actuation)	DTC and propulsion	Machine	On board
(Independent) Fallback		Machine	On board

DFFAS System - Composition and System Status Definition

Subsystem	Main Functions	
Maneuvering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collect Information around own ship Plan Short-Term Navigation (collision avoidance) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Control actuator Monitor & operate DFFAS System remotely
Propulsion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collect information of engine condition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor & operate engine & power plant remotely
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achieve communication between ship & Fleet Operation Center (FOC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor communication quality
Fleet Operation Center(FOC) System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collect wide variety of information for safe navigation (weather, traffic etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan a Long-Term Navigation (voyage planning)
Centralized Information Management System (CIM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collect condition of other subsystems Judge the status of DFFAS System 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feedback the determined status of the whole DFFAS system to each subsystem



Status	Definition	
Normal	System is running without any intervention by crew or fallback from shore	Level4
Active Monitoring	System is running under the verification by operator at shore	Level3
Remote Fallback	System is running under fallback operations by operator at shore	Level1
Independent Fallback	System is running under fallback operations by system on vessel	Level0

System status definition:

The definition of the whole system status is based on degree of engagement by human on shore and necessity of fallback operation.

Ref) OneSea definition


DFFAS System - Operation Flow




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ConOps development




Systems development process



STPA

STPA
FMEA




STPA: Systems Theoretic Process Analysis
FMEA: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Concept of Operation (ConOps)

ConOps contents for autonomous system

Contents	Description
1. Introduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Background System Scope, Assumption & Constraints
2. Evolution of System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Justification for changes Future Roadmap and Status of the envisioned system
3. Description of System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Needs, Goals & Objectives of the system Overview Architecture incl. Interfaces (Major System elements & interconnections) Modes of Operation Basic Functions (Proposed Capabilities)
4. Operational Environment and Scenario	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use Cases (Nominal, Off nominal) Actors/Stakeholders Operational Scenario Data flow (input & output of the system)
5. Impacts and Potential Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational impacts, Environmental Impacts, Organizational Impacts, Scientific/Technical Impacts Regulatory Compliance, How to Implement the system
6. Human-Systems Integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human-in-the-loop involvement Human-machine interface etc.
Appendix	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Glossary, Acronyms, Reference Documents

Required elements for system description




Ref. INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook

Safety Constraints (SC)

- Safety Constraints (SC) are considered as the sub-goals to achieve to achieve the goal, safety autonomous navigation.
- SC violations are defined as hazardous events, which should be avoided.
- Basically, we tried to prove safety equivalence of autonomous ship operations to conventional operations at each SC.

SC	Description
SC1	Own vessel states must be detected: system conditions and sensor-detected values etc.
SC2	Other vessels and those states must be detected: existence and course, heading, speed and positions.
SC3	Natural environments which affect the system must be detected: wind, wave, tidal stream, temperature, etc.
SC4	Static constraints which are essential to achieve voyage must be obtained.
SC5	Navigation and/or action plan must be established.
SC6	Control signal must be calculated based on navigation/action plan.
SC7	Geographic information to navigate must be detected.
SC8	Seaworthiness including condition of equipment and hull must be analysed and actions must be selected based on own status and surrounding environment.
SC9	Dynamic constraints must be analysed based on static constraints and internal/external environment (e.g., short stopping distance, Turning circle).



The autonomous system concept design, APExS-auto, received AiP from ClassNK and BV in March 2022

Risk assessment and management

Bow-tie risk analysis

- SC violations are considered as incident, which is the top event of fault trees placed at the center of bow-tie diagram and should be protected by appropriate barriers.
- Barriers are placed to block propagation of threats.
- Threats are extracted by STPA analysis of the target system as UCAs(Unsafe Control Actions).
- Of the barrier categories, those related to system design are functional requirements.
- Barrier effects values are used for quantitative risk assessment.

Requirement detailed function (Lower layer)

Anomaly of SOED(nature environment detection)/ SC3 violation - Detecting natural environments which affects system (wind, wave, tidal stream, temperature, etc.)





Figure: BowTie Diagram – SOED/SC3 violation

Model-based development (MBD) – simulation tests




- ▶ Simulation tests are utilized for unit test and system integration test.
 - MIL(Model-In-the-loop)
 - HIL(Hardware-In-the-loop)

- ▶ Vessel dynamic models built as FMU (Functional Mockup Unit)

- ▶ FMU parameters of hull, thruster & rudder are calibrated based on model test results and actual ship data at sea trials to have necessary fidelity to test control system.



Simulation test platform CyberSea (DNV)



Ref) DNV Marine Cybernetics Advisory

<https://www.dnvgl.com/services/hil-testing-concept-explanation--83385>

- System integration tests were conducted to identify issues before actual installation of the system on the target vessel
- All the system/equipment except for some sensors (e.g. radar) are integrated and tested with a virtual ship on CyberSea simulator.
- Normal/abnormal situations are tested for coastal navigation, berthing and unberthing scenario
 - Normal ... 75 sequence
 - Abnormal ... 34 sequence
 - Through voyage ... 8 voyages



Snapshot of system integration test
@ Fleet Operation Center (FOC)

30 items, not detected at early stages, were found and corrected prior to loading the system on the vessel.



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Demonstration voyages in Feb & Mar 2022

Port of Tsu-Matsusaka
Incl. Irago Strait traffic route in Ise bay

Port of Tokyo
Incl. Uraga Strait traffic route

FOC
Makuhari

Round trip
424 NM (790km)

← 26-27 Feb 2022

→ 28 Feb – 1 Mar 2022



Demonstration of simulated actual fully autonomous operations on congested routes


Containership "Suzaku", 749GT with fully autonomous functions

An example case of collision avoidance in Tokyo bay on 26 Feb 2022



7:59:16 AM

- The planned route is blocked by Obstacle Zone of Target (OZT) of other surrounding ships.




8:00:04 AM

- A new route is generated by the collision avoidance function
- The new route is automatically approved by the system under supervision by shore captain.



8:01:09 AM

- The new route is not blocked by OZTs and the vessel automatically track the new route.




8:01:53 AM

- The collision avoidance function generates a slightly modified new route due to occurrence of another OZT
- The new route is automatically approved by the system under supervision by shore captain.

Tokyo Bay

Feb 26, 2022




SFT Info(1/1)
SFT 3240

Close

BRG	175.6° T
RNG	1.870 NM
COG	176.6° T
SOG	12.69 kn
CPA	0.114 NM
TCPA	-16:07
BCR	0.568 NM
BCT	-10:56
Reliability	100
Std.Src	X
Srscs	A,X,S,SR1,SR2
Status	Normal
MMSI	431000705
Name	SATSUKI MARU
Class	Medium sized ship (80%)
Risk Lv.	Safe (0.00)
Bumper	missing
Fake Accuracy	***
Confirm. flag	false

Plan : 7.2 kn



HDG : 182.8° Wind : 033.6°
 SOG : 5.8 kn 13.4 kn
 Next WPT : 180.8° Steering limit

35° 20.733' N TTG
 139° 43.424' E 0:28
 156.8° T 2.67NM

182.8°
Primary

ROT: -100.0 -50.0 0.0 50.0 100.0

DTC Status

AP Working Status	APU
SP Working Status	APU
DP Track Status	Tracking Off
DP WPT Status	Calculating

Actu. P1' Order P1'

Flap Rudder Angle

Check ETA

WPT : 55

Distance : 0.24NM

Plan : 08:00 26 Feb 2022

Actual : 08:01 26 Feb 2022

To Localtime

Off Plan : 00:00

SPD Calculation : 7:54

Suggested SPD

HDG **182.8°** INS
 SPD **5.8kn** INS
 0.0kn BT
 COG **182.5°** INS
 SOG **5.8kn**
 POSN INS **35° 23.192' N**
139° 42.137' E

Offset
WGS84

TM Reset off

MENU

Route Information

Route : JPTYO-AP01C-oA1..

Plan Speed : 7.2 kn

Plan Course : 181.0°

XTD LIM: 60.0/60.0m

XTD : -3.2 m

Steering Mode : TC

TC : GoAW Appr. Enabled

To WPT : 66

DIST to WOP: 0.19 NM

Time to Go : 0: 1'59"

Turn RAD : 0.12 NM

ROT : -000.6° /min

Next WPT : 67

Next Course : 180.8°

Overlay / NAV Tools

TT/AIS

TT	AIS
OFF	OFF

Vector 3min T.GND

CPA/TCPA 0.3NM 15min

AIS CPA AUTO ACT FILT

Lost TGT FILT

無人運航船プロジェクト

MEGURI 2040

THE NIPPON FOUNDATION

Close

Results of demonstration voyages

1. Westbound (26-27th Feb. 2022)

Port of Tokyo → Port of Tsu-Matsusaka off

Distance: 207.5NM (384.3KM)

Sailing time: 20h10m

Hours of autonomous operation: 19h39m

Ave. Speed: 10.3kt

Actions for collision avoidance: 107 times

* Number of avoiding ships were not countable

Percentage of
autonomous operation

97.4%

2. Eastbound (28thFeb.-1st Mar. 2022)

Port of Tsu-Matsusaka off → Port of Tokyo

Distance: 216.4NM (400.8KM)

Sailing time: 19h38m

Hours of autonomous operation: 19h34m

Ave. Speed: 11.0kt

Actions for collision avoidance: 34 times

* Number of avoiding ships were not countable

Percentage of
autonomous operation

99.7%

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- ▶ With the support of the Nippon Foundation, the NYK Group is working on the Designing the Future of Fully Autonomous Ship Project (DFFAS Project) with the cooperation of more than 60 partners.
- ▶ During the demonstration voyage in February and March 2022, we successfully conducted the first in the world fully autonomous demonstrated operation of long-distance voyages including congested areas. The success ratio of fully autonomous operation was 98.5% in total.
- ▶ To develop safety of the complex autonomous navigation system, we were using a modern engineering methodology, so called V-process, which includes ConOps, model-based systems engineering (MBSE) and model-based development (MBD).
- ▶ 9 Safety Constraints(SC) were considered as sub-goals in the system design. Functional requirements to the system were extracted as barriers to prevent propagation of threats to SC violation in bow-tie risk assessment.



DFFAS

Designing the Future of Full Autonomous Ship

Thank you for your listening.

Source: DFFAS CONSORTIUM

無人運航船プロジェクト
MEGURI
2040



日本財団
THE NIPPON FOUNDATION

